| Pre-Bankruptcy
Planning: A Lawyer's Duty or Death Wish?
by S. Ward Greene
Greene & Markley, P.C.
"It's
real simple, Ward. You must refuse to give any asset protection
advice." My partner and I had been discussing the recent Oregon
Supreme Court case of Granewich v. Harding, 329 Or 47 (1999), which
held that attorneys may be liable to third parties when they assist
their clients in committing "tortious" conduct. His warning was
the product of his observations of some dangerous trends in both
state and federal court whenever pre- bankruptcy planning has been
scrutinized by appellate judges.
My partner's advice was sound, if the role of a debtor's attorney
were merely to show the client how to fill out bankruptcy schedules
and the statement of affairs. However, to assist a beleaguered
debtor in lawfully preserving and protecting the maximum amount
of property, a lawyer can do much more; but at what risk?
In this article, I will touch briefly on some of the cases which
create or identify potential problems for debtors and their attorneys.
The waters are, indeed, infested with sharks. Heedless of all
the dangers, I will then offer some suggestions for permissible
planning alternatives. Then you're on your own.
Perhaps the seminal case in this area is Wudrick v. Clements,
451 F2d 988 (9th Cir 1971). That case stands for the simple proposition
that it is permissible (practically patriotic) for a debtor to
purposefully convert non-exempt assets into exempt assets on the
eve of bankruptcy. The Ninth Circuit recognized the importance
of a "fresh start" for debtors and acknowledged that state and
federal legislatures had created classifications of certain types
and amounts of assets which were necessary for a grubstake for
the debtor. Although the issue was not mentioned, the facts of
the case show that the debtors intended to hinder their creditors.
Apparently, that caused no problem.
In the more recent case of In re Bernard, 96 F3d 1279 (9th Cir
1996), the Court of Appeals made it clear that, under 727(a)(2)(A),
any transfer during the year prior to filing, with intent to hinder
or delay a creditor, is sufficient to deny the discharge. The
Bernard court also held that a debtor need not succeed in harming
creditors to warrant a denial of discharge. Moreover, depletion
of estate assets is not a prerequisite to a denial of discharge
under the Bernard decision. The Bernard case can be read to support
the proposition that just moving assets from one bank to another,
if the transfer is coupled with an effort to fend off a creditor,
would be enough to deny the debtors a discharge. The breadth of
the holding is frightening whenever a debtor asks what can be
done to preserve the greatest amount of his or her assets.
A number of courts have had occasion to consider whether "advice
of counsel" prior to filing bankruptcy should be considered as
a defense when deciding whether to deny a discharge or impose
other penalties on the debtor. The leading case on this subject
in the Ninth Circuit is In re Adeeb, 787 F2d 1339 (9th Cir 1986).
Mr. Adeeb was being threatened by one of his creditors when some
unsophisticated attorney suggested that he transfer all his real
property to "third parties who could be trusted." Luckily for
Mr. Adeeb, a bankruptcy attorney later advised him to reverse
the transfers and to disclose them to his creditors. He met with
a number of his creditors and revealed the fraudulent transfers,
stating that he was in the process of reversing them. Shortly
thereafter, an involuntary petition in bankruptcy was filed against
Mr. Adeeb and the bankruptcy court denied his discharge pursuant
to 11 USC § 727(a)(2)(A).
Mr. Adeeb argued that he lacked actual intent to hinder or delay
his creditors because he had relied on the advice of an attorney.
Although acknowledging that such reliance may have a bearing on
wrongful intent, the court held that a debtor's reliance must
be in good faith. Because Mr. Adeeb knew that the purpose of the
transfer was to hinder or delay a creditor, he was precluded from
raising the defense of good-faith reliance on the advice of counsel.
(Because the court wanted to encourage curative action by debtors
in Mr. Adeeb's position, the court ruled that the discharge would
not be denied if all fraudulent transfers were undone.)
In a more recent case, In re Rice, 109 BR 405 (Bkrtcy ED Calif
1989), a debtor's bankruptcy attorney advised him to "draw as
much money as he could out of his bank account and spend it."
During the denial of discharge litigation, the court focused on
the limits of legal advice obtained in contemplation of bankruptcy.
The court ruled that whenever a debtor deliberately spends money
to prevent it from falling into the hands of a bankruptcy trustee
or creditors he is, a fortiori, committing waste and hindering
or delaying his creditors. Under those circumstances, advice from
a bankruptcy attorney would not create a safe harbor. The Rice
court acknowledged that certain types of pre- bankruptcy exemption
planning may be permissible. But it "necessarily entails limits
and is not to be construed as a license to waste assets." p. 409.
The implication is clear that attorneys are permitted to assist
their clients in reasonable exemption planning. To the extent
that planning results in the debtor emerging from bankruptcy with
an increased stake of exempt property, a debtor apparently may
rely in good faith on the advice of his attorney.
The question becomes more difficult when the pre-bankruptcy planning
relates to the protection or preservation of business assets.
The goal is essentially the same, but the legal precedents are
less clear. A bankruptcy court in Minnesota attempted to articulate
a standard for permissible pre-bankruptcy planning which would
also seem to apply to business assets. (In re Johnson, 124 BR
290 (Bkrtcy D Minn 1991)). In Johnson, the debtor had liquidated
numerous non-exempt assets and bought exempt assets. (Although
it was not an issue in that case, the court observed that the
debtor had consulted with several attorneys about his deepening
financial problems and had acquired a clear understanding of Minnesota
exemption laws. That observation by the court raises a concern
that there may be a backlash; if the soon-to-be debtor consults
with a bankruptcy attorney before making any pre-bankruptcy transfers,
he must have intended to put the assets outside the reach of his
creditors.) While the issue in the Johnson case was the conversion
of assets into exempt property, its discussion may apply to other
situations as well. The court observed that some types of property
which debtors attempt to preserve are well-suited to enable them
to maintain a degree of personal economic security by continuing
to carry on a past profession or trade. P. 295. Unfortunately
for the debtor in the Johnson case, the evidence was clear that
the debtor was simply to trying to put his money outside the reach
of his creditors (he bought paid-up life insurance, which he later
cashed in, but had no dependents; and he bought valuable musical
instruments, stored in the basement, which he did not know how
to play). His discharge was denied.
We don't know whether Mr. Adeeb or Mr. Rice or Mr. Johnson tried
to blame their attorneys for their discharge problems. A little
closer to home, we do have the example of debtors who were denied
a discharge and later accused their attorneys of malpractice.
In the case of Woodfield and Pearce, 978 F2d 516 (9th Cir 1992),
the debtors transferred their business assets into a new corporation
on the eve of bankruptcy. The transfer included franchises, equipment,
fixtures, inventory and cash; the debtors received all of the
stock in the corporation and listed it on their bankruptcy schedules.
Although the bankruptcy court and the district court rejected
the creditor's effort to deny their discharge, the 9th Circuit
reversed. The issue of good-faith reliance on the advice of counsel
was not discussed by the Court of Appeals. However, it is now
public knowledge that the debtors subsequently sued their attorneys
and received a substantial payment in settlement of their claims.
The cautious lawyer should ask herself whether she will be a malpractice
target if the pre-bankruptcy planning done with her debtor-client
proves to be unsuccessful. Of course, if the attorney is very
careful in warning the client of the potential problems, can good-faith
reliance on the attorney's advice ever be a defense? The Woodfield
case is especially troublesome because the type of pre-bankruptcy
planning done by the debtors in that case is not unusual. And
it seems indisputable that the attorneys were trying to assist
their clients to preserve the greatest amount of assets.
Another lawyer who was trying to help his clients protect their
assets wound up in deep trouble with the Bar. In In re Hockett,
303 Or 150 (Or 1987), the lawyer represented debtors and their
spouses in orchestrating their "friendly" divorces. Mr. Hockett's
efforts yielded a 63-day suspension from the practice of law.
In addition to the obvious conflict, the Supreme Court concluded
that the lawyer violated DR 7-102(A)(7) which forbids a lawyer
from assisting the client in conduct "the lawyer knows to be illegal
or fraudulent." The court also concluded that by assisting the
clients in creating fraudulent transfers, the lawyer was guilty
of conduct involving dishonesty, a violation of DR-102(A)(4).
It may come as no surprise that the property settlements in the
divorces were both set aside in state court as fraudulent conveyances.
It is not clear whether bankruptcies ensued, but there can be
little doubt that the debtors would have been subject to a denial
of discharge had they filed for bankruptcy within one year after
the fraudulent transfers. These events also could have resulted
in a malpractice claim against the attorney who participated in
the scheme.
Now, to make matters worse, the Oregon Supreme Court in the Granewich
case has added the possibility that the lawyer who provides pre-bankruptcy
advice may be named as a defendant if a creditor sues the debtors
for damages resulting from a fraudulent transfer. Although the
Granewich case addressed claims by a minority shareholder that
the majority shareholders and their lawyers were attempting a
corporate squeeze out, the reasoning would apply equally well
to pre-bankruptcy transfers. The lawyers in Granewich were alleged
to have knowingly assisted the majority shareholders in breaching
the fiduciary duties that they allegedly owed to the plaintiff.
The court ruled that the lawyers need not have committed any tortious
act, but would be held liable for "acting in concert" with another
person who committed a tortious act. The Supreme Court disregarded
the fact that the lawyers owed no duty to the minority shareholder.
They even went so far as to say that the lawyers stand in no different
position in relation to the plaintiff and anyone else and "their
status as lawyers is irrelevant." What this decision will mean
regarding litigation strategy and matters of privilege is still
unclear. But it certainly creates another enormous risk for lawyers.
So what's a lawyer to do? I remember some years ago hearing a
crusty old debtors' attorney (he was probably about my present
age) speaking at a seminar about pre-bankruptcy transfers. He
opined that, to avoid a denial of discharge, the debtor must have
"an empty head and a pure heart." That is still a pretty good
rule for avoiding dischargeability problems. Applying the rule
to real life situations can be quite daunting. Especially so because
the knowledgeable lawyer will make sure that the client does not
have an empty head.
I want to offer some hypothetical situations and then discuss
what I hope would be permissible pre-bankruptcy planning alternatives.
Needless to say, every case stands on its own facts. I disclaim
any responsibility if you or your clients get hammered for trying
any of these tactics.
Assume that your new client is the sole shareholder of a small
business corporation. He has guaranteed many of the corporation's
debts and the creditors have grown impatient. The corporation
is floundering, but may be able to hang on for a little while.
What should he do?
Of course, a threshold question is whether the business itself
can and should be saved. Assuming the answer is yes, the key creditors
have to be identified and placated. If they have personal guaranties,
the corporation should grant and perfect security interests in
favor of the key creditors who hold personal guaranties. If the
creditors won't cooperate, but the business is too small to warrant
even a simple chapter 11, the owner should consider liquidating
the corporation, distributing all the assets to himself, then
filing a chapter 13. Beware of hidden tax consequences before
your recommend this approach. Obviously, the client has to be
careful that the mix of secured and unsecured debts will fit within
the jurisdictional requirements of chapter 13. He may need to
grant a security interest to an otherwise unsecured creditor to
shift the mix of unsecured to secured debt so that he qualifies
for chapter 13.
Because the ultimate solution may include a personal bankruptcy,
the debtor must also consider personal exemption planning. His
spouse should be alerted to the possible need for separate counsel.
Depending upon how much time he has before the filing, he should
consider segregating 25% of his net wages in a separate bank account
which will be exempt, up to $7,500, under ORS 23.166. He should
also maximize any retirement plan contributions and repay or restore
any loans from his retirement plan. He should attempt to maximize
his homestead exemption and all the other permissible statutory
exemptions. All such transfers and transactions should be done
with a pure heart. In other words, the debtor should have reasonable
estate planning and exemption planning goals as the motivating
force, not a desire to frustrate or hinder his creditors
By way of illustration, I want to offer a true story of a client
I spoke to some years ago. He was a father of five young children.
He had been involved in a serious auto accident. Although it was
not his fault, he knew that as a result of some unusual circumstances,
he might suffer huge liabilities. He had substantial assets which
would be an easy target if anyone was successful in obtaining
a judgment against him in the future. Although he had been married
to the same woman for many years, all of their marital assets
sat in his name. I explained to him that reasonable estate planning
often requires that assets be divided equally between a husband
and wife and may include the suggestion that any real property
be held as tenants by the entireties. These are reasonable, rational
transfers, not efforts to defraud a creditor.
This young man then inquired whether he was "allowed" to buy life
insurance for his wife and kids. When I learned that he had no
life insurance, I was appalled. The question of how much life
or disability insurance was appropriate, whether it should be
whole life or term, paid up or purchased on an installment plan,
were all questions I suggested he discuss with an insurance agent.
Again, I trust that, within reason, his decision (long overdue)
to buy insurance would not be considered a fraudulent transfer.
Let's change our hypothetical. Assume the debtor operates a business
as a sole proprietorship. He and 12 other people are employed
by the business. He has invested everything in the business and,
although the business is making money (like the goose laying little
tiny golden eggs), his personal financial affairs are like a train
wreck. He has been subsidizing the business by underpaying himself
for the last three years, but has insufficient liquid assets to
hold off his creditors. I believe he can form a new corporation
or LLC and contribute all of the business assets to that entity
in exchange for stock or membership. He may want to include other
key employees in the planning and ownership of the business, but
needs to be alert to securities issues. The new entity will assume
the important liabilities of the business and will take all assets
subject to any existing security interests. The entity will begin
paying him fairly for his services and might want to consider
an employment contract with him and other key employees.
Needless to say, all of these transfers will be fully disclosed
on the Statement of Affairs and any resulting assets (i.e., stock
or LLC membership) will be fully disclosed on his schedules. With
any luck, he will be able to "buy back" the corporation from his
trustee for a reasonable price. It is unlikely that any stranger
would want to buy a closely held corporation. It is doubtful that
the business assets would have much value if the corporation were
liquidated and the secured debts all paid.
In all these examples and suggestions, some creditors will be
hindered or delayed. However, it can be argued that the debtor's
intent was to accomplish permissible estate planning and business
planning goals; any detriment to the creditors would be purely
incidental. Moreover, if properly structured, the creditors as
a whole will be no worse off than they would have been had they
been dealing with a debtor who had his "affairs in order." It
is unlikely that the creditors relied on a lack of rational business
and estate planning when they extended credit to the debtor.
There is no law that requires debtors to be sitting ducks for
their creditors. Furthermore, there is no policy reason for letting
a viable business collapse simply because its owner has become
insolvent. So long as the pre-bankruptcy transfers are done in
broad daylight, for reasonably equivalent values, and for the
"right" reasons; and so long as the debtor is not a "hog" (you
know the cliche), the transfers should withstand a challenge in
the bankruptcy court. I believe it is a lawyer's duty to inform
and educate his clients as to the alternatives and the risks attendant
to each of the choices they might make. There is nothing negligent,
dishonest or fraudulent about providing that service to your clients.
But please be careful.
This
article is intended to inform the reader of general legal principles
applicable to the subject area. It is not intended to provide
legal advice regarding specific problems or circumstances. Readers
should not act upon this information without seeking competent
legal counsel for their specific situation.
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